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Abstract 
 
Many investors confine their mutual fund holdings to a single fund family, either for 
simplicity or through restrictions placed by their retirement savings plan. We find 
evidence that mutual fund returns are more closely correlated within than between fund 
families. As a result, restricting investment to one fund family leads to a greater total 
portfolio risk than diversifying across fund families. The increased correlation is due 
primarily to common stock holdings, but is also more generally related to families having 
similar exposures to economic sectors or industries. Fund families also show a propensity 
to focus on high risk or low risk strategies, which leads to a greater dispersion of risk 
across restricted investors. An investor considering adding an additional fund either 
inside or outside the family would need to believe the inside fund offered an additional 
50 to 70 basis points in return to achieve the same Sharpe ratio. 
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Abstract 
 
Many investors confine their mutual fund holdings to a single fund family, either for 
simplicity or through restrictions placed by their retirement savings plan. We find 
evidence that mutual fund returns are more closely correlated within than between fund 
families. As a result, restricting investment to one fund family leads to a greater total 
portfolio risk than diversifying across fund families. The increased correlation is due 
primarily to common stock holdings, but is also more generally related to families having 
similar exposures to economic sectors or industries. Fund families also show a propensity 
to focus on high risk or low risk strategies, which leads to a greater dispersion of risk 
across restricted investors. An investor considering adding an additional fund either 
inside or outside the family would need to believe the inside fund offered an additional 
50 to 70 basis points in return to achieve the same Sharpe ratio. 
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Individuals often place all of their mutual fund investments with one family of 
mutual funds. Employer sponsored retirement plans often necessitate this behavior by 
limiting fund choices to the offerings of a single family.1 Load fees, which are typically 
not charged when switching funds within a family, also encourage family loyalty. On a 
more basic level, investors may restrict their attention to one family to help narrow the 
search process and simplify record keeping. In this article, we examine whether the 
propensity of investors to confine their investments to a single fund family influences the 
risk characteristics of their portfolios. 
This issue has received little attention in the literature of financial economics. 
There are reasons to suspect that the correlation among funds in the same family is lower 
than correlation of funds across families, and reason to suspect it is higher. The principal 
reason to suspect that correlation may be lower within families than between families 
stems from the desire of a fund family to capture as much of an investor’s assets as 
possible. In order to do so, the fund family should offer a diverse set of funds so that the 
investor need not go outside the family for diversification reasons. Khorana and Servaes 
(2003) find that product differentiation is effective in obtaining market share. This desire 
to capture market share should lead a family to offer funds which have lower correlation 
than randomly selected funds across families. 
A second reason to expect diversity among funds offered by the same family is 
the well-documented impact of having a Morningstar five-star fund or high return fund 
on cash flows to the fund family as documented by Khorana and Servaes (2003). A 
recognized strategy for having a top-performing fund is to offer a lot of funds, each of 
                                                 
1 For example, Elton, Gruber and Blake (2004) study over six hundred 401K plans and find that most 
restrict fund choices to one family. This is relevant for most investors since 401K investments comprise a 
significant component of investors’ financial assets. For example, ICI (2000) reports that more than 60% of 
401K plan participants have no other security investments (stocks, bonds, etc.). Moreover, Choi, Laibson, 
Madrian, and Metrick (2004) estimate that for households with annual incomes between $20,000 and 
$70,000, the median household has less than one month's worth of income invested outside of their 401K 
plan. 
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which reacts to different factors (influences). This would result in within-family funds 
having low correlations. 
On the other hand, there are several reasons to expect that funds may be more 
similar inside than outside fund families. Portfolio managers within families are likely to 
have access to the same research analysis produced either by internal analysts or by a 
particular set of external research firms. Many families also have a prescribed investment 
style that influences the type of securities they hold. A common view on individual 
companies could lead to similar stock holdings across portfolios with even different 
objectives. In addition, a family’s relationship with an investment brokerage firm could 
also lead to common holdings of new offerings. 
Fund similarities within families may also arise from macro level influences. 
Portfolio managers may begin the security selection process with an economic forecast 
that is shared by other fund managers within the firm. For example, a family’s portfolio 
managers may sit on a strategy committee that shares insights regarding the overall 
economy. A common family-wide economic outlook could result in similar exposures to 
various economic sectors. Commonalities related to both sectors and individual securities 
will be greater whenever one portfolio management team manages multiple funds within 
a family. 
In this study we examine how these conflicting influences of demand from the 
market for diversification and the effect of firm structure effect the correlation between 
funds in the same family relative to across families. 
Our analysis suggests that investors who limit their investments to one fund 
family hold more highly correlated funds than those who diversify across families. Both 
within and across objectives, fund return correlations are significantly higher inside than 
outside fund families. An examination of fund holdings, combined with a factor model to 
characterize fund returns, reveals that roughly two thirds of the increase in return 
correlation is related to common stock holdings with the rest attributable to similar 
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exposures to broad economic factors. The extent of overlap in stock holdings within a 
family is surprising. Depending on the objective group being considered, as much as 34% 
of total net assets consist of stocks held in common, for funds with the same objective. 
For funds with different objectives the medium percent of the portfolio held in the same 
securities is 17% inside the family compared to 8% outside the family. These differences 
mean that for an investor to select an additional fund inside a fund family rather than 
outside a fund family often requires an increase in return of from 50bp to 70bp to 
maintain the same Sharpe ratio on her portfolio. 
 We also find evidence that fund families show a propensity to focus on either high 
risk or low risk strategies. Within each objective, families are significantly more likely to 
have mutual funds with standard deviations higher or lower than the median standard 
deviation for that classification. While this phenomenon does not increase the risk of an 
average investor’s portfolio, it does increase the distribution of risk across investors. The 
increased dispersion increases the probability of having very high risk by investing 
exclusively in one family. Taken together, our results indicate that confining mutual fund 
investments to one family has a detrimental effect on investor risk that is statistically and 
economically meaningful. On average, portfolios of funds within families result in 
greater overall risk and greater risk clustering than similar portfolios created from funds 
across families. 
The reason these results arise and their importance can be illustrated by 
considering two funds in the same family: The Eaton Vance Special Equities Fund and 
Eaton Vance Tax Managed Small Cap Growth Fund. The Investment Company Data Inc. 
(ICDI) classifies the special equity fund as Aggressive Growth and the small cap fund as 
Long-Term Growth. They have separate prospectuses and are categorized on the family’s 
web site in different groups of funds. The prospectus of the Special Equities Fund states 
the objective as “Growth in Capital” whereas the Managed Small Cap Growth Fund’s 
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stated objective is “A diversified fund seeking long-term after-tax returns by investing in 
emerging growth companies.” 
An investor looking at standard materials from Eaton Vance would have little 
reason to believe the funds were similar. However, the correlation between their monthly 
returns over a five-year period is 0.995. Both funds employ the same portfolio manager. 
The rank order of the major holdings in the two funds is the same, with only small 
differences in percentages invested. The rank order of the amount invested in each 
economic sector is the same, with only small differences in the percentages invested in 
any sector. Thus, an investor hoping to diversify by buying shares of both funds would be 
disappointed with the resulting risk profile. 
Our study focuses on characteristics of investor risk. If certain families have funds 
that consistently outperform on a risk-adjusted basis, investing in a single family may be 
optimal even though portfolio risk is elevated. Our results highlight the added risks 
associated with this type of strategy and the added return necessary to compensate for this 
risk. 
 The paper is organized as follows: Section I discusses the sample and the data 
sources we use in the study. Section II examines the correlation between fund returns 
within and between fund families, where funds are grouped according to standard 
objective classifications. Section III shows the impact of increased correlation within a 
family on the increased return an investor should require for adding a firm within a 
family rather than outside the family. In Section IV we begin our examination of the 
determinants of the increased correlation by applying factor models to remove the impact 
of various economic sectors. This allows us to examine return correlation due to sector 
and security bets as opposed to macro market bets. Section V examines the actual 
security holdings of funds to examine the extent to which higher correlation within a fund 
family is due to holding the same securities. In Section VI we study the propensity of 
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families to engage in high or low risk strategies by studying similarities in fund standard 
deviations. Section VII offers conclusions and implications for investors. 
1. The Data 
 The principal source of our data is the CRSP Mutual Fund Database.2 Our initial 
sample is all fund families that existed in January 1998 and the mutual funds that were 
part of these families.  We use objective classifications from Investment Company Data 
Inc. (ICDI) to categorize funds and eliminate the following: specialized funds, index 
funds, international funds, money market funds, single state municipal funds, precious 
metal funds, sector funds, and utility funds. This left us with funds in eleven ICDI 
objective categories. From this list we eliminate duplicate funds (versions of the fund that 
differ only in the expenses charged), which are of two varieties. First, many funds have 
multiple share classes related to different fee structures and we eliminate all but the class 
with the longest history. Second, many families offer the same fund to institutional 
investors or to financial planners under different names, and we eliminate the duplicate 
funds. Finally, we perform a detailed examination of pairs of funds that were highly 
correlated to ensure that duplicate funds are removed from the sample. 
 After removing duplicate funds, we then eliminate all fund families with a single 
remaining fund. For this remaining set of families we draw a final sample by randomly 
selecting one in three fund families while maintaining the same distribution of families in 
terms of the number of mutual funds offered. The resulting sample consists of 988 unique 
funds from 100 different families. Table 1 shows the number of funds within four broad 
objective categories (stock, combination, high-yield, and bond), and eleven 
subcategories.3 The vast majority of families offer a stock fund, either aggressive and/or 
                                                 
2 CRSP database suffers from omission bias, a form of survivorship bias. See Elton, Gruber and Blake 
(2001). Survivorship bias is not important for this study because we are looking at diversification at a point 
in time and we have data on all funds at that time. 
3 Subsequently, the aggregate classification “stock” will refer to funds with aggressive growth or long-term 
growth ICDI objectives; “combination” will refer to funds with both stocks and bonds in their portfolios as 
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long-term growth. Most families also offer at least one combination fund and one bond 
fund. Across objectives, the median number of funds per family is six. The largest family 
in the sample had 85 distinctly different funds. 
For each fund we draw monthly returns for up to five years starting January 1998. 
In what follows, if a fund ceased to exist we calculated correlations over the common 
period (none had less than a year’s data). In addition to data on fund families and returns, 
we also collect data on fund stock holdings from Thompson Financial Services’ Mutual 
Fund Holdings database. We obtain portfolio holdings for funds that report their holdings 
for December of 2000. 
II.  Correlation Within and Between Fund Families 
 The first attribute of fund family risk we explore is fund return correlation. We 
calculate correlations for each pair-wise combination of fund objectives. Specifically, for 
each fund within a fund family we compute the correlations with all other funds in the 
family with a given objective and the correlation with funds outside the family with the 
same objective. For example, when calculating the average correlation within the family 
between aggressive growth and long-term growth funds, we also calculate the average 
correlation between an aggressive growth (long-term growth) fund within a family and 
long-term growth (aggressive growth) fund from outside the family. We then average 
these results across all families. We calculate statistical significance using two methods: a 
two-sample t-test of difference in mean correlations, and a one-sided binomial test that 
the proportion of families with greater within-family correlations is greater than 0.5. 
 The results are presented in Table 2. The table documents a pattern of increased 
correlation within families. For example, consider combining a stock fund with a 
combination fund. The fifth row of Table 2 shows that 78 fund families offered at least 
                                                                                                                                                 
designated by the objectives Total Return, Growth and Income, Balanced, and Income; and “bond” will 
refer to Ginnie Mae, High Quality Bond, High Quality Municipal Bond, or Government Securities funds.  
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one stock fund and one combination fund. The average correlation between stock funds 
and combination funds is 0.757 if they are inside a family and 0.709 if they are from two 
separate families. For 67% of the families, selecting stock and combination funds from 
inside the family results in a higher correlation than selecting from two different families. 
 For each of the broad objective pairs shown in Table 2, within-family correlations 
are higher than between-family correlations.4 Combining funds into stock-stock, 
combination-combination, and stock-combination pairs results in statistically significant 
higher return correlations within families than outside families using both t-tests and the 
binomial test. The influence of fund families on return correlations is weaker among bond 
funds. None of the correlations involving bond funds are statistically significant 
according to t-tests. 
 When funds are grouped according to more narrowly defined objectives, we find 
fourteen of the correlation differences are statistically significantly higher within families 
at the one percent level using the t-test. Using the binomial test, eleven are statistically 
significant at the one percent level and fifteen are significant at the five percent level. The 
results for bond funds remain weak after partitioning funds into the more narrowly 
defined objective categories. 
 The correlations reported in Table 2 are generally reasonable in magnitude. The 
correlation between two stocks funds is higher than the correlation between a stock and a 
combination fund, which in turn is higher than the correlation between a stock and a high 
yield bond fund, which is higher than the correlation between a stock and a bond fund. 
The high correlation between combination funds is somewhat surprising. We show later 
that combination funds hold the highest percentage of stocks in common both for funds 
inside and outside the family, which may reflect a similar equity objective (stability of 
                                                 
4 In the interest of space we omit several groupings with a smaller likelihood of commonality based on the 
type of securities held, such as Ginnie Mae–Aggressive Growth. In general the omitted objective pairs 
show higher correlation inside than outside families, although the differences tend to be small and none are 
statistically different from zero. 
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return). The high correlation among high yield bond funds is also intuitive, due to the 
relative homogeneity of strategy across funds. The correlation between bond and stock 
funds and bond funds and combination funds is negative, reflecting the correlation 
between stocks and bonds during the sample period. 
 As a robustness check, we examine whether the results are sensitive to the method 
used to classify objectives. Brown and Goetzmann (1997) find evidence that funds 
classify their objective in a strategic way that reduces the accuracy of reported 
classifications. Although this is less of a concern for our broad objective measures, we 
also group funds into eleven style categories based on cluster analysis approach similar to 
Brown and Goetzmann (1997). Although some of the funds are reshuffled into different 
categories, the difference in correlations within and between groups are very similar to 
the results shown in Tables 2 and are not reported for brevity.  
 We also examine whether the correlation differences are sensitive to the size of 
the family. Grouping families into categories based on the number of funds in the family 
gives results similar to those in Table 2 with no pattern across different size families. 
Thus, the number of funds in a family did not change the relation of within family 
correlation to between family correlation.  
 While we believe examining correlation differences is more illuminating for 
understanding differences between internal and external funds, it is covariance that 
affects total portfolio risk. One should expect that correlation differences carry over to 
covariance differences because funds that are internal when we examine one fund family 
are external when we examine a different family.5 Table 3 tests this directly. In Table 3 
we compute differences in covariance within a family and between families when two 
stock funds, a stock and a combination fund, or two combination funds are combined. In 
each case within-family covariance is higher by approximately 8.7% to 17.7%. The 
                                                 
5   This relationship between relative correlations and covariances can be shown analytically. 
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differences are statistically different at the 1% level for funds of the same category, and 
5% across categories. These differences become more important as the number of funds 
increases because covariance risk becomes the dominant factor in determining total risk. 
 We now examine the economic significance of the correlation pattern discussed 
above. 
III. The Significance of Correlation Differences Within and Between Fund Families 
 The correlation differences shown in Table 2, while generally statistically 
different, are small in magnitude. In this section we use two approaches to show that the 
correlation differences are economically meaningful. First, we calculate the extra return 
an investor would need to justify adding an additional fund within a family rather than 
outside a family while maintaining the same Sharpe ratio. Second, we explore the number 
of internal funds that need to be added rather than an external fund to maintain the same 
risk. 
A. Return Differences 
 Initially we examine the following question. Assume an investor is adding an 
additional fund and can add a fund from the same family or from a different family. How 
much higher must the return on the fund in the same family be so that adding this fund 
results in the same Sharpe ratio as adding a fund from outside the family? Table 4 
presents the results for different initial portfolios and the addition of one or two new 
funds. In calculating return differences we assume investors place an equal amount in 
each fund.6 We further assume that all stock funds have a variance of returns equal to the 
average for stock funds in our sample and likewise for combination funds (reported in 
Table 1), and rely on the correlation estimate from Table 2. Finally, we use as expected 
returns the realized returns on the S&P Index and small capitalization stocks from 
                                                 
6   The 1/n rule has supported empirically by Benartzi and Thaler (2001) and Liang and Weisbenner (2002). 
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Ibbotson (2004). If the fund being added was a combination fund, we assume it had an 
equal amount in stocks and bonds and used as an expected return on bonds the realized 
return on long-term bonds from Ibbotson (2004). 
 Table 4 presents the results assuming an investor initially owned from one to 
seven stock funds (column 1) and added either an additional stock fund, two additional 
stock funds, or a combination fund. Elton, Gruber & Blake (2004) report more than 80% 
of 401K plans offer six or more funds to participants. The Investment Company Institute 
reports that the median number of funds held directly by individual investors is three. 
Thus, we focus on the rows corresponding to larger numbers of initial funds. Consider the 
impact of additional funds when the investor starts with five. If the investor adds a large 
cap stock fund, the investor would have to believe the same family fund offered an 
additional 54bp of return to justify staying within the family. If the fund being added was 
a small cap mutual fund, the investor would have to believe the same family had an 
additional 72bp of return to justify staying within the same fund family. Similar numbers 
occur for adding two stock funds and somewhat lower numbers for adding a combination 
fund. Clearly, the more funds the investor currently holds within a fund family, the 
greater the return required to add an additional fund within the same family. 
 Under many assumptions the addition of a fund and the amount added depends on 
the ratio of alpha to residual risk. This is the Treynor Black rule (1973) with single index 
models, and is the Elton Gruber (1992) rule for multi-index models. We computed the 
percentage increase in alpha required to have the same desirability of adding a same-
family fund as adding a new family fund. In calculating this we used the correlations and 
variances from the two- and six-factor models discussed in Table 5. 
 To have the same alpha over residual risk from adding a fund in the same family 
rather than outside the family using the two-index model required an increase in alpha of 
23% to 39% if adding one fund to an existing three to six funds, 20% to 37% if adding 
 11
two funds, and 18% to 28% if adding a combination fund. Similar results hold if the six-
index model is used. 
 Thus, although the correlation differences shown in Table 2 are small, the amount 
of extra return or alpha required to justify adding a fund from the same family rather than 
from a new family is substantial. Similar results hold when we examine risk.  
B.  Risk Differences 
 An alternative way to examine the importance of the correlation differences 
shown in Table 2 is to examine the impact of the higher within-family correlation on the 
number of funds that must be added to obtain a given level of risk. 
 Consider the following exercise. Assume an investor holds a fund with a 
particular objective, and she is considering adding one or two new funds to her portfolio.7 
The investor can add these funds from inside or outside the fund family. For each new 
outside fund, we calculate the number of new inside funds that would need to be added to 
arrive at the same level of portfolio risk. We make two simplifying assumptions. We first 
assume that equal amounts are invested in each fund. Our second simplifying assumption 
is that all funds within an objective classification have the same variance, which we 
measure as the average across all funds with that objective. 
 Consider an investor who holds either a stock or a combination fund and wishes to 
add another fund from the same or different family. In order to have no more risk, adding 
same-family funds rather than one fund from a different family, the investor would have 
two or three same-family funds. If the investor currently held more than one fund, then 
the number of same-family funds that need to be added to have no more risk is 
substantially larger. 
IV. What explains the higher correlation? 
                                                 
7 The Investment Company Institute reports that in 2002 the median (mean) number of stock funds held by 
individual households that hold at least one mutual fund is 3 (5).  We have excluded mixtures of stock and 
bond funds because as shown in Table 2 for these categories there is no increase in correlation by selecting 
funds within a family, rather than between families. 
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In this section we use a number of diagnostic approaches to examine the portfolio 
management activities that lead to the increased correlation among funds within families. 
We begin with a macro level approach. If portfolio managers within a family begin the 
security selection process with a shared economic forecast, we may expect similar 
exposures to different economic factors. We examine this hypothesis with a number of 
multi-index models, beginning with a two-factor model. 
A. Two-Index Model – Sensitivity to Bonds and Stocks 
 Combination funds own both bonds and stocks, stock funds frequently own some 
bonds, and bond funds often contain some securities with stock-like attributes. Thus, we 
begin with a two-index model where stock returns are measured using the value weighted 
CRSP index and bond returns are measured using the Merrill Lynch aggregate U.S. 
Corp/Gov/Mortgage bond index. For each fund in our sample we estimate a least squares 
regression on five years of monthly data to estimate the following relationship:8
   ( ) ( )i F i is s F iB B FR R B R R B R R e− = α + − + − + i   
Where  is the return of fund i,  is the riskless rate,  is the return on the stock 
index,  is the return on the bond index,  and  are the sensitivity of fund returns 
to the stock and bond index, 
iR FR MR
BR isB iBB
iα  is the non-market return, and  is a random error. Under 
the two-index model, the correlation between two funds, i and j is given by: 
ie
 
( ) ( )2 2cov cov( ) cov( )i j is js s iB jS iS jB iB jB B i j
i j i j
R R B B B B SB B B SB B B E e e+ + + += σ σσ σ σ σ   
where 2Sσ  and 2Bσ  are the variance of the stock and bond indexes and cov(SB) is the 
covariance between indexes, 2iσ  and 2jσ  are the standard deviation of funds i and j, and 
( )jieeE  is the covariance of the fund return residuals. 
                                                 
8  For the regressions we require the fund to have at least 36 monthly return observations. 
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 The above expression separates the correlation between funds into two parts, the 
correlation due to systematic movements and the part due to residual movements. This 
decomposition allows us to examine how much of the higher correlation within a family 
is due to systematic market effects and how much is due to residual effects. Residual 
correlation can come about because two funds hold the same securities or because they 
are sensitive to similar factors not captured by the two-factor model. For example, a 
family may employ similar style choices such as emphasizing small stocks or large stocks 
or have a similar sensitivity to a particular industry factor such as technology stocks. 
An increase in systematic correlation would come about if funds in the same 
family have similar portfolio sensitivities to bonds and stocks. For example, if the 
average combination fund is equally invested in stocks and bonds, but a particular family 
chooses to hold 70% in bonds, we would expect to observe higher systematic within-
family correlation. The average difference in within-family correlation compared to 
between-family correlation due to residual correlation is the difference in the value of 
( )i j i jE e e σ σ  for the two groups. 
 In Table 5 we examine the within- and between-family correlation due to residual 
commonality for the pairs of objectives where within-family correlation is higher than 
between-family correlation at a statistically significant level. We start by examining the 
aggregate groups from Table 2, for the two-index model. As shown in Table 5, Panel A 
the contribution to overall correlation from residual correlation is higher for two funds in 
the same family than when funds are in the two different families. The differences in 
residual correlation are significant for the same three broad objective cases (stock-stock, 
stock-combination, and combination-combination) where difference in overall correlation 
were significant in Table 2. If one compares the differences in correlation in Table 4 with 
the differences in correlation in Table 2, then it is apparent that the higher overall within-
family correlation is almost completely due to higher residual correlation. For the three 
aggregate pairs where the differences are significant the percentage of the overall 
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differences in correlation due to differences in residual correlation are 110% (stock-
stock), 100% (stock-combination, 104.3% (combination-combination). 
 A similar pattern exists for the more narrowly defined objective categories. The 
residual correlation accounts for more than 80% of the difference in within-family and 
between-family correlation except for aggressive growth with growth and income (where 
it accounts for 66%), long-term growth with growth and income (75%), and balanced 
with balanced (48%). Note that the only pairings where systematic influences have an 
important influence on correlation differences are pairings involving combination funds. 
This implies that one of the reasons these funds have higher within-family correlation is 
that they make similar choices concerning the split between stocks and bonds. 
B. Multi-Index Models 
 Panel B of Table 5 shows the results for a six-factor model, which adds the Fama-
French size and value factors (Fama and French, 1992), and decomposes the bond factor 
into three separate bond indexes (government, mortgage-backed, and high yield). The 
table indicates that higher residual correlation within a family is still an important 
component of the overall increase in correlation, but its relative importance falls. For the 
four cases shown in Table 2 where within-family correlation was significantly higher 
than between-family correlation, the percentage of the overall difference due to residual 
correlation from a six-index model was 78% (stock-stock), 48.3% (stock-combination), 
58.7% (combination-combination), or an average of 62%. Comparing Panels A and B, 
about 41% of the difference in the residual correlation between within and between 
family funds is explained by common factors beyond market factors. 
 The same general pattern exists when we use the more narrowly defined ICDI 
classifications. When pairing aggressive growth with aggressive growth, 81% of the 
additional correlation within families is due to residual correlation. When grouping 
aggressive growth with growth and income, 36% is due to residual correlation, and when 
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grouping balanced with balanced, 33% is due to residual correlation. For the remaining 
categories, roughly 50% of the difference in correlation is due to residual risk. While 
some of the increased correlation is due to a common sensitivity to non-market factors, 
the residual is still an important component.9
 If we have successfully captured all of the relevant factors, then the remaining 
correlation in residuals is due to common holdings. In addition, some of the effect of 
common holdings may be captured in the loadings to non-market factors. Thus, it is 
worthwhile to examine the effect of common holdings directly. 
V. Common Holdings 
 We now examine the extent to which common holdings of individual stocks 
translate into increased return correlations within fund families. We first document the 
amount of common holdings and then relate this to fund return correlations. 
A. Difference in Common Holdings 
 The first question to examine is whether funds in the same family hold more 
securities in common than funds in different families. The simplest measure of common 
holdings for two funds is to sum the minimum fraction of the portfolio held in any stock i 
between the two funds or: 
   ( )COM( , ) min ,Ai BiiA B X X= ∑ . (6) 
where  is the fraction of fund A’s portfolio invested in stock i, and  is the fraction 
of fund B’s portfolio invested in stock i. 
AiX BiX
 For most mutual funds included in the Thompson Financial database, the 
aggregate amount invested in stocks does not equal 100% of total net assets. The 
                                                 
9 We also fit an eight-factor model that uses five industry portfolios and the three bond indexes and find 
similar results. 
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principal reason for this is that most mutual funds hold some cash. Certain mutual funds 
such as balanced funds may hold a large fraction of their assets in bonds and the 
Thompson database only includes stock holdings. A second possible reason is that some 
small stock holdings may not be included in the Thompson database. Equation (6) can 
understate the impact of common holdings for it assumes that there are no holdings of 
common stocks omitted from the Thompson database and there is no impact (extra 
correlation) due to bonds held in common. The effect of these omissions on return 
correlations should be small, both because the Thompson database contains a large 
fraction of common stock holdings and because the correlation between any pair of bonds 
is so high that common holdings does not cause much of an increase in correlation. The 
reason for this will be clear shortly when we examine how common holdings affect 
correlation. 
Nevertheless, in order to clarify the extent of common holdings, we formulate a 
second measure that expresses the holdings as a fraction of the total identifiable amount 
of common stock held in the portfolio so the percentages add to 100% as follows: 
   ( )COM , min ,Ai Bii
Ai Bi
X X
A B
X X
⎛ ⎞′ = ⎜⎜⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ ∑ ⎟⎟   
 Which of these measures is more accurate depends on the proportion of holdings, 
whether bonds or stocks, not shown in the Thompson database that are held in common. 
If the only securities held in common are those listed in the Thompson database, then the 
first measure is accurate. If the portion of securities held in common for those omitted 
from the Thompson database is the same as the portion of stocks held in common for 
those included in the Thompson database, then the second measure is an accurate 
measure of common holdings. Both of the measures can be calculated for pairs of funds 
inside the family and pairs of funds in different families. 
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 The results are shown in Table 6. The table shows the common holdings for all 
stock and combination funds combined and for each of the subcategories.10 Examining 
Panel A reveals (even under our conservative measure of common holdings) a 
surprisingly high level of common holdings and a larger increase in common holdings 
when one compares within-family funds with between family funds. Starting with the 
aggregate comparison, we see that within families the grouping stock-stock has 13.3% of 
the portfolio in common, for stock-combination groupings the overlap is 14.9%, and for 
combination-combination it is 27.4%. Furthermore, all of these percentages are more than 
twice as large as the percentages of common holdings in the same category when a fund 
inside the family is compared to a fund outside the family, and all of the differences are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 When we examine the more narrowly defined objectives we see similar overall 
results. In all cases, funds in the same family hold more stocks in common than funds 
outside the family. Nine of the 14 combinations are statistically significant.. Panel B 
documents the same pattern of results for the alternative measure of common holdings. 
The logical question to ask is how much of the increased correlation between funds in the 
same family is due to this phenomenon. 
B. Impact of Common Holdings on Correlation  
 If we assume for the moment that the variance of all stocks can be reasonably 
represented by a single number CVAR and that the covariance between pairs of stocks can 
be represented by a single number CCOV, then we can express the covariance between 
two funds which hold only stocks but hold some securities in common as:  
                                                 
10 We lose some observations due to an insufficient match of TNA/fund name between CRSP and 
Thomson. The table omits the Balance-Balance and Total Return-Total Return groupings due to 
insufficient number of observations. 
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   ( )
1 1
COV ,
N N
A B Ai Bi Ai Bi
i S i j
j i
R R X X CVAR X X CCOV
∈ = =≠
= +∑ ∑∑  (7) 
Where S is the set of all stocks held in common and the summation is across stocks not 
held in common. Note that the first term shows the impact on covariance when two 
stocks are held in common, and the second term when they are different stocks.11 For all 
stocks not held in common either  or  must be equal to zero. Thus we can write 
the equation as: 
AiX BiX
  
( ) [ ]
1 1
COV ,
-
N N
A B Ai Bi Ai Bi
i S i jA B A B A B
R R X X X X
CVAR CCOV CCOV
∈ = =
= +∑ ∑∑σ σ σ σ σ σ  (8) 
Since we only have information on stock holdings, we underestimate the effect on 
common holdings for funds which have bonds in their portfolio or where small holdings 
of stocks are left out. However, since pairs of bonds should be highly correlated, the 
difference between variance and covariance is small and examining the first term of 
Equation (8) shows the impact on portfolio correlation should be small. Thus, we will 
only present data assuming we have all the common holdings. 
 The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (8) represents the contribution of 
common holdings to the correlation between fund A and fund B. We compute the average 
for this statistic when fund A and fund B are in the same family, and a second average for 
the case where they are in different families. We then take the difference in this ratio and 
divide it first by the total correlation difference and second by the residual correlation 
from the one-index model (similar to the number in Table 4).12 The first represents the 
fraction of the difference in correlation between funds in the same family and funds not 
in the same family that is due to the difference in common holdings. 
                                                 
11  The covariance between two stocks is ij i jρ σ σ . If they are held in common,  and 1ijρ = i jσ σ=  and 
the covariance becomes the variance. 
12 The correlation numbers are not identical to those in Table 4 due to the omission of funds without a 
sufficient match between CRSP and Thomson. 
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 The results are reported in Table 7. Common stock holdings account for 44% of 
stock-stock, 43% of stock-combination, and 89% of combination-combination correlation 
differences when we use our conservative estimate of common holdings. The estimates 
using the narrowly defined objective groupings show a similar pattern. The smallest ratio 
of correlation difference related to common holdings is 27%. Overall, common holdings 
explain roughly 50% of the difference between the correlation in fund returns (as well as 
residual fund returns) for funds inside and outside the family. 
VI. Differences in Variance Across Fund Families 
 In addition to increased correlation, limiting investments to one family may also 
result in a greater dispersion of risk across investors. If several funds within a family 
share a similar strategy, we might expect fund variances not to be randomly distributed 
across families. Thus, if investors are restricted to one family, then similar strategies 
within families would cause a greater dispersion of portfolio risk among investors than if 
high- and low-variance funds were randomly dispersed across fund families. 
 We measure the propensity of families to choose high risk or low risk strategies 
by constructing a binomial test.13 We begin by calculating the median standard deviation 
for each of the ICDI categories. We then label all funds with standard deviations above 
(below) the median for that objective as HIGH (LOW). We then examine whether the 
distribution of HIGHs and LOWs within fund families is different from that expected by 
chance. 
 Define ,g hY  as the number of HIGHs obtained for fund family h when there are g 
funds in family h, and let ( )2. , 1/ 2g h g hT Y g= − . If the assignment of high and low 
variance funds to a fund family is random, then we would expect on average for a fund 
family to have 2g  HIGHs. Thus, ,g hT  becomes large if high risk funds are concentration 
                                                 
13  We thank Gary Simon for suggesting this approach. 
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in some families while low risk funds are concentrated in others. If the distribution of 
HIGHs and LOWs within a family is random, then under the null the Yg,h are independent 
binomial (g, 12 ) random variables and the test statistic ,g hT  has the following moments: 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ){ }
( )
2
, , ,
2
, ,
24 2
1 1
, ,2 2
222 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
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3 1 6
1
8
g h g h g h
g h g h
g h g h
g
E T E Y g Y
T Y g
E Y g E Y g
g g g
g g
− = =⎡ ⎤=⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ = −⎣ ⎦
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
⎡ ⎤= × + × − × − ×⎣ ⎦
−=
  
Letting H be the total number of fund families and gh be the number of funds in family h, 
we can test risk clustering using the following normally distributed test statistic: 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
, , ,
1 1 1
2
,
1 1 1
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1
2 4
8
H H H
g h g h g h
h h h
H H H
h h
g h h h
h h h
Z T E T T
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= = =
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤= −⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
−⎛ ⎞= − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
  
Performing the risk concentration test for stock, combination, high-yield, and bond 
categories separately results in t-statistics equal to 3.02, 3.03, 0.63, and 2.8. The test 
across all fund objectives is 4.09. All are significant at the 1% level, with the exception of 
high-yield bonds. Another way of conceptualizing the extent of concentration of variance 
is to note that for 22 out of the 100 fund families in our sample every fund in the family 
was in the high or low variance group. High and low variances are more concentrated in 
families than would be expected by chance. 
VI. Conclusion 
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Individual investors often restrict the mutual funds they select to the offerings of a single 
fund family. In addition, a common structure of 401K and 403B plans is that all the 
offerings are from one family. In this paper we show that this restriction causes investors 
on average to have higher risk portfolios than if they selected similar funds across 
different fund families. The principal reason for this higher risk is that funds within a 
family have higher correlation than if funds were selected from two families. This higher 
correlation holds for all ICDI categories involving stock and combination funds both 
when two funds are in the same ICDI category or when they are in two different ICDI 
categories. 
 For an investor to have the same Sharpe ratio when adding another fund from 
within a family rather than from another family would require the in-family fund to have 
an additional 50 to 70 basis points in extra return. 
 Why does this increase in fund return correlation come about? When we split the 
increase in correlation between common response to market movements and increase due 
to residual correlation, we find that for most combinations more than 90% is due to 
residual correlation. Examining the effects of common holdings on the increase in 
correlation, we find about 60% of the increase in correlation is due to common holdings. 
Thus about 30% is due to a common response to factors other than the market, such as 
industry and sector factors. The surprising result of this analysis is the size of common 
holdings. Depending on the group examined, between 4% and 34% are held in common 
with a median within family holding of roughly 16%. 
 There is another source of risk in addition to the increased fund return correlation. 
High and low risk funds are concentrated in different families. While this doesn’t 
increase an investor’s average risk, it does increase the distribution of risk across 
investors. The increased distribution raises the probability of having a bad outcome by 
investing in only one family. Overall, the results suggest that on the basis of risk and in 
the absence of proven ability of certain families to produce excess return, investors would 
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be wise to build portfolios of funds from different families, and that retirement plan 
administrators would do well to include offerings for more than one mutual fund family. 
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Table 1       
Mutual fund family summary statistics     
 Number  Number Median  Average Average 
Objectives Of Funds Of Families Per Family Maximum Return Risk 
Stock  384 94 3 29 0.21 7.30 
 Aggressive Growth 166 75 2 10 0.26 8.08 
 Long-term Growth 218 82 2 19 0.16 6.70 
Combination 275 83 2 18 0.23 4.49 
 Total Return 50 30 1 5 0.40 3.52 
 Growth and Income 128 65 1 9 0.19 5.48 
 Balanced 65 47 1 4 0.22 3.33 
 Income 65 47 1 4 0.17 4.38 
High Yield Bond 39 31 1 3 -0.08 2.67 
Bond 290 74 2 25 0.46 0.94 
 Ginnie Mae Bond 40 21 2 5 0.48 0.67 
 High Quality Bond 105 56 1 9 0.47 0.95 
 Municipal Bond 79 43 1 5 0.40 1.09 
 Government Securities 66 43 1 10 0.49 0.93 
All Objectives 988 100 6 85 0.28 4.47 
The table shows characteristics of the fund families considered in the study. The Stock, Combination, and
Bond objectives are decomposed into subcategories. The Number Of Families refers to the number of
families with at least one fund of that objective category. Median Per Family refers to the median number
of funds for the subset of families that offer a fund of that objective. Maximum refers to the largest number
of funds of that type for any family. Also reported is the average return and standard deviation for each
objective classification. The sample period covers 1998 through 2002, and the return and objective data are
taken from the CRSP mutual fund database. 
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Table 2       
Return correlations by objective within and outside fund families 
   Within Outside    
   Family Family  Percent Binomial
Objectives Obs Corr. Corr. t-stat Larger p-value 
Stock – Stock 77 0.774 0.734 3.70 0.714 0.000 
 Aggressive Growth – Aggressive Growth 41 0.780 0.738 2.49 0.634 0.030 
 Aggressive Growth – Long-term Growth 62 0.757 0.718 3.66 0.661 0.004 
 Long-term Growth – Long-term Growth 42 0.805 0.774 2.33 0.690 0.004 
Stock – Combination  78 0.757 0.709 4.71 0.667 0.001 
 Aggressive Growth – Total Return 28 0.710 0.706 0.26 0.536 0.286 
 Aggressive Growth – Growth and Income 48 0.695 0.660 2.50 0.667 0.007 
 Aggressive Growth – Balanced 39 0.719 0.681 2.57 0.718 0.002 
 Aggressive Growth – Income 22 0.644 0.631 0.68 0.636 0.067 
 Long-term Growth – Total Return 28 0.772 0.735 2.19 0.821 0.000 
 Long-term Growth – Growth and Income 52 0.793 0.757 2.26 0.673 0.004 
 Long-term Growth – Balanced 44 0.844 0.769 4.92 0.864 0.000 
 Long-term Growth – Income 26 0.740 0.716 1.17 0.577 0.163 
Stock – High Yield Bond 31 0.498 0.495 0.34 0.645 0.035 
Stock – Bond 70 -0.146 -0.142 -0.43 0.400 0.940 
Combination – Combination 55 0.835 0.766 5.32 0.782 0.000 
 Total Return – Total Return 10 0.839 0.731 2.73 0.800 0.011 
 Total Return – Growth and Income 23 0.766 0.734 1.25 0.696 0.017 
 Total Return – Balanced 16 0.777 0.760 0.69 0.750 0.011 
 Total Return – Income 16 0.769 0.719 2.16 0.625 0.105 
 Growth and Income – Growth and Income 30 0.857 0.805 3.11 0.767 0.001 
 Growth and Income – Balanced 34 0.868 0.799 4.05 0.824 0.000 
 Growth and Income – Income 20 0.845 0.809 2.63 0.800 0.001 
 Balanced – Balanced 12 0.920 0.832 3.52 1.000 0.000 
 Balanced – Income 18 0.824 0.803 1.10 0.611 0.119 
 Income – Income 4 0.859 0.836 0.40 0.500 0.313 
Combination – High Yield 31 0.476 0.472 0.48 0.484 0.500 
Combination – Bond 67 -0.147 -0.132 -1.69 0.403 0.929 
High-Yield Bond – High-Yield Bond 6 0.890 0.858 1.92 0.833 0.016 
High Yield Bond – Bond 30 0.009 0.007 0.15 0.567 0.181 
Bond – Bond 50 0.688 0.686 0.21 0.560 0.161 
 Ginnie Mae Bond – Ginnie Mae Bond 11 0.808 0.723 1.76 0.818 0.006 
 High Quality Bond – High Quality Bond 23 0.663 0.613 1.44 0.696 0.017 
 Municipal Bond – Municipal Bond 20 0.929 0.913 1.91 0.850 0.000 
 Government Securities – Government Securities 14 0.856 0.851 0.19 0.714 0.029 
The table reports average return correlations of funds within and outside fund families. Correlations are 
averaged first within families and then across families. The number of observations is the number of families 
with at least one pair of funds matching the objectives being considered. “Stock” refers to funds with 
Aggressive Growth or Long-Term Growth objectives; “Combination” refers to Total Return, Growth and 
Income, Balanced, or Income; “Bond” refers to Ginnie Mae funds, High Quality Bond, High Quality 
Municipal Bond, or Government Securities. The sample period covers 1998 through 2002, and the return and 
objective data are taken from the CRSP mutual fund database. 
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Table 3      
Difference in fund return covariance inside and outside fund families  
   Difference   
   in Return  Percentage 
Objectives Obs Covariance t-stat Difference 
Stock – Stock 77 0.000394 2.50 10.0 
Stock – Combination  78 0.000414 1.86 17.7 
Combination – Combination 55 0.000133 2.47 8.7 
The table reports average return covariance difference of funds within and outside fund
families. Covariances are averaged first within families and then across families. The
number of observations is the number of families with at least one pair of funds matching
the objectives being considered. “Stock” refers to funds with Aggressive Growth or Long-
Term Growth objectives; “Combination” refers to Total Return, Growth and Income,
Balanced, or Income; “Bond” refers to Ginnie Mae funds, High Quality Bond, High Quality
Municipal Bond, or Government Securities. The sample period covers 1998 through 2002,
and the return and objective data are taken from the CRSP mutual fund database. 
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Table 4         
Additional return (%) necessary to maintain the same Sharpe Ratio when adding funds inside 
rather than outside the fund family 
 
# of Funds Add One Add Two Add One 
Currently Stock Fund Stock Funds Combination Fund 
Held Large Cap. Small Cap. Large Cap. Small Cap. Large Cap. Small Cap. 
1 0.298 0.397 0.314 0.417 0.339 0.451 
2 0.415 0.552 0.400 0.533 0.404 0.538 
3 0.476 0.634 0.454 0.604 0.431 0.574 
4 0.514 0.684 0.490 0.651 0.446 0.593 
5 0.539 0.718 0.515 0.686 0.455 0.606 
6 0.558 0.742 0.535 0.712 0.462 0.614 
7 0.572 0.761 0.550 0.732 0.466 0.621 
An investor is assumed to start with a number of mutual funds held within a fund family and adds one or 
two additional funds. The table shows the additional annual return the funds from inside the family would 
have to provide in order to maintain the same level of risk-adjusted performance as when adding funds 
from outside the family. Outside funds are assumed to earn the average return for Large Capitalization or 
Small Capitalization stocks as reported by Ibbotson-Sinquefield (13% and 17.3%). Combination Funds 
are assumed to be equally invested in stocks and bonds (which earn 6%). Fund variances and covariances 
are calculated for each objective classification group as in Tables 1 and 2. “Stock” refers to funds with 
Aggressive Growth or Long-Term Growth objectives; “Combination” refers to Total Return, Growth and 
Income, Balanced, or Income. The sample period covers 1998 through 2002, and the return and objective 
data are taken from the CRSP mutual fund database. 
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Table 5 
Determinants of the difference in fund return correlations inside and outside fund families 
  Return    
  Correlation Systematic Idiosyncratic 
Panel A: Two-factor model Obs Difference Comp. Comp. Ratio 
Stock – Stock 77 0.040 -0.004 0.044 1.10 
   Aggressive Growth – Aggressive Growth 41 0.042 0.001 0.041 0.98 
   Aggressive Growth – Long-term Growth 62 0.039 0.005 0.034 0.87 
   Long-term Growth – Long-term Growth 42 0.032 0.000 0.032 1.00 
Stock – Combination  78 0.048 0.000 0.048 1.00 
   Aggressive Growth – Growth and Income 48 0.035 0.012 0.023 0.66 
   Aggressive Growth – Balanced 39 0.038 -0.001 0.039 1.03 
   Long-term Growth – Total Return 28 0.037 0.007 0.029 0.78 
   Long-term Growth – Growth and Income 52 0.036 0.009 0.027 0.75 
   Long-term Growth – Balanced 44 0.075 0.000 0.075 1.00 
Combination – Combination 55 0.068 -0.004 0.072 1.06 
   Total Return – Total Return 10 0.108 0.006 0.102 0.94 
   Total Return – Income 16 0.050 0.000 0.050 1.00 
   Growth and Income – Growth and Income 30 0.052 0.010 0.042 0.81 
   Growth and Income – Balanced 34 0.069 0.003 0.066 0.96 
   Growth and Income – Income 20 0.036 0.008 0.028 0.78 
   Balanced – Balanced 12 0.089 0.046 0.043 0.48 
      
Panel B: Six-factor model      
Stock – Stock 73 0.036 0.008 0.028 0.78 
   Aggressive Growth – Aggressive Growth 36 0.037 0.007 0.030 0.81 
   Aggressive Growth – Long-term Growth 61 0.038 0.018 0.020 0.53 
   Long-term Growth – Long-term Growth 40 0.036 0.016 0.020 0.56 
Stock – Combination 75 0.058 0.030 0.028 0.48 
   Aggressive Growth – Growth and Income 44 0.033 0.022 0.012 0.36 
   Aggressive Growth – Balanced 36 0.034 0.015 0.019 0.56 
   Long-term Growth – Total Return 26 0.043 0.023 0.020 0.47 
   Long-term Growth – Growth and Income 50 0.036 0.020 0.016 0.44 
   Long-term Growth – Balanced 42 0.079 0.043 0.036 0.46 
Combination – Combination 52 0.075 0.031 0.044 0.59 
   Total Return – Total Return 8 0.127 0.053 0.075 0.59 
   Total Return – Income 12 0.040 0.017 0.023 0.58 
   Growth and Income – Growth and Income 28 0.050 0.025 0.025 0.50 
   Growth and Income – Balanced 33 0.078 0.044 0.034 0.44 
   Growth and Income – Income 17 0.047 0.024 0.023 0.49 
   Balanced – Balanced 10 0.103 0.070 0.034 0.33 
The idiosyncratic component of return correlation is measured by the average covariance of fund return 
residuals, scaled by the standard deviation of each fund’s returns; the systematic correlation is the correlation 
related to common exposure to return factors. Residual returns are obtained by regressing excess fund returns 
on the excess return of several index factors. The last column shows the ratio of the idiosyncratic component 
over the return correlation difference. Panel A shows the results for a two factor model, which includes the 
Value weighted CRSP Index (from Ken French) and the excess return on the Merrill Lynch aggregate U.S. 
Corp/Gov/Mortgage bond index. The six-factor model in Panel B adds equity size and value factors (SMB 
And HML), as well as mortgage and high yield indexes. The number of observations is the number of 
families with at least one pair of funds that matches the objectives being considered. Stock refers to 
Aggressive Growth and Long-Term Growth; Combination refers to Total Return, Growth and Income, 
Balanced, and Income; Bond refers to Ginnie Mae funds, High Quality Bond, High Quality Municipal Bond, 
and Government Securities. The sample period covers 1998 through 2002, and the return and objective data 
are taken from the CRSP mutual fund database. 
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Table 6 
Common stock holdings for funds within and outside fund families 
  Common Holdings  
  Within Outside  
Objectives Obs. Family Family t-stat 
Panel A: Percentage of total net assets     
Stock – Stock 47 0.133 0.056 3.51 
   Aggressive Growth – Aggressive Growth 25 0.139 0.029 2.72 
   Aggressive Growth – Long-term Growth 41 0.095 0.038 2.93 
   Long-term Growth – Long-term Growth 25 0.169 0.104 2.13 
Stock – Combination  49 0.149 0.071 4.28 
   Aggressive Growth – Growth and Income 25 0.040 0.029 1.46 
   Aggressive Growth – Balanced 18 0.059 0.024 1.76 
   Long-term Growth – Total Return 15 0.157 0.079 1.79 
   Long-term Growth – Growth and Income 29 0.222 0.129 3.66 
   Long-term Growth – Balanced 18 0.214 0.084 3.77 
Combination – Combination 30 0.274 0.128 4.77 
   Total Return – Income 5 0.176 0.081 1.96 
   Growth and Income – Growth and Income 14 0.236 0.174 2.69 
   Growth and Income – Balanced 14 0.340 0.119 4.55 
   Growth and Income – Income 6 0.272 0.150 2.01 
     
Panel A: Percentage of stock holdings     
Stock – Stock 47 0.144 0.060 3.50 
   Aggressive Growth – Aggressive Growth 25 0.145 0.030 2.79 
   Aggressive Growth – Long-term Growth 41 0.101 0.040 2.93 
   Long-term Growth – Long-term Growth 25 0.184 0.110 2.14 
Stock – Combination  49 0.184 0.083 4.29 
   Aggressive Growth – Growth and Income 25 0.042 0.030 1.47 
   Aggressive Growth – Balanced 18 0.092 0.034 1.87 
   Long-term Growth – Total Return 15 0.253 0.121 1.95 
   Long-term Growth – Growth and Income 29 0.236 0.136 3.58 
   Long-term Growth – Balanced 18 0.326 0.119 3.56 
Combination – Combination 30 0.404 0.163 4.50 
   Total Return – Income 5 0.251 0.121 1.74 
   Growth and Income – Growth and Income 14 0.250 0.184 2.71 
   Growth and Income – Balanced 14 0.546 0.167 4.31 
   Growth and Income – Income 6 0.328 0.169 2.02 
The table reports the average percentage of holdings in common for funds within and outside 
fund families. For each fund pair, the common percentage holdings are calculated as 
Σsmin(Xsi, Xsj) where Xsi represents the percentage of fund j’s holdings in stock s. Panel A 
calculates holdings as a percentage of total net assets, and Panel B reports holdings as a 
percentage of total stock holdings. The number of observations is the number of families with 
at least one pair of funds that matches the objectives being considered. Stock refers to 
Aggressive Growth and Long-Term Growth; Combination refers to Total Return, Growth and 
Income, Balanced, and Income. Fund holdings are taken from Thomson Financial and are 
measured in December of 2000. 
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Table 7 
Percentage of the difference in return correlation inside and outside fund families due to common 
holdings 
  Difference in Portion due to 
  Correlation Common Holdings 
Panel A: Percentage of stock holdings Obs Return Residual Return Residual 
Stock – Stock 47 0.039 0.036 0.44 0.48 
   Aggressive Growth – Aggressive Growth 25 0.041 0.042 0.27 0.27 
   Aggressive Growth – Long-term Growth 41 0.035 0.032 0.35 0.38 
   Long-term Growth – Long-term Growth 25 0.014 0.014 1.37 1.44 
Stock – Combination  49 0.051 0.053 0.43 0.42 
   Aggressive Growth – Growth and Income 25 0.010 0.014 0.58 0.44 
   Aggressive Growth – Balanced 18 0.058 0.049 0.33 0.39 
   Long-term Growth – Total Return 15 0.040 0.033 0.62 0.75 
   Long-term Growth – Growth and Income 29 0.040 0.030 0.47 0.62 
   Long-term Growth – Balanced 18 0.092 0.100 0.67 0.61 
Combination – Combination 30 0.074 0.066 0.89 0.99 
   Total Return – Income 5 0.056 0.040 2.11 2.96 
   Growth and Income – Growth and Income 14 0.018 0.015 1.15 1.38 
   Growth and Income – Balanced 14 0.126 0.135 0.94 0.88 
   Growth and Income – Income 6 0.038 0.036 0.66 0.69 
The table shows the influence of common stock holdings on the difference between fund return correlations 
within and across fund families. The influence of common holdings is measured by increased correlation 
over a benchmark portfolio with different stocks. The number of observations is the number of families 
with at least one pair of funds that matches the objectives being considered. Stock refers to Aggressive 
Growth and Long-Term Growth; Combination refers to Total Return, Growth and Income, Balanced, and 
Income; Bond refers to Ginnie Mae funds, High Quality Bond, High Quality Municipal Bond, and 
Government Securities. The sample period covers 1998 through 2002, and the return and objective data are 
taken from the CRSP mutual fund database. Fund holdings are taken from Thomson Financial and are 
measured in December of 2000. 
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